Recently, a variant of proxy re-encryption, named conditional proxy re-encryption (C-PRE), has been introduced. Compared with traditional proxy re-encryption, C-PRE enables the delegator to implement fine-grained delegation of decryption rights, and thus is more useful in many applications. In this paper, based on a careful observation on the existing definitions and security notions for C-PRE, we reformalize more rigorous definition and security notions for C-PRE. We further propose a more efficient C-PRE scheme, and prove its chosenciphertext security under the decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) assumption in the random oracle model. In addition, we point out that a recent C-PRE scheme fails to achieve the chosen-ciphertext security.
Introduction
In 1998, Blaze, Bleumer and Strauss [1] introduced the notion of proxy reencryption (PRE). In a PRE scheme, a proxy is given a re-encryption key, and thus can translate ciphertexts under Alice's public key into ciphertexts under Bob's public key 1 . The proxy, however, cannot learn anything about the messages encrypted under either key. PRE turns out to be a useful primitive, and has found many applications requiring delegation of decryption right, such as encrypted email forwarding, secure distributed file systems, and outsourced filtering of encrypted spam.
Nevertheless, there exist some situations which are hard for traditional PRE to tackle. For example, suppose some of Alice's second level ciphertexts are highly secret, and she wants to decrypt these ciphertexts only by herself. Unfortunately, traditional PRE enables the proxy to convert all of Alice's second level ciphertexts, without any discrimination. To address this issue, two variants of PRE were independently introduced: one is named type-based proxy re-encryption (TB-PRE) introduced by Tang [5] , and the other is named conditional proxy reencryption (C-PRE) introduced by Weng et al. [6] . Although different in naming, C-PRE and TB-PRE are the same in spirit (for consistency, in the rest of the paper, we use C-PRE to denote the two variants.). In such systems, ciphertexts are generated with respect to a certain condition, and the proxy can translate a ciphertext only if the associated condition is satisfied. Compared with traditional PRE, C-PRE enables the delegator to implement fine-grained delegation of decryption rights, thereby more useful in many applications.
Our Motivations and Results
We first investigate the definitions and security notions for C-PRE defined in [6, 5] . Both have their respective pros and cons: (i) In Weng et al. ' s definition, the proxy needs two key pairs (i.e., the partial re-encryption key and the condition key) to perform the transformation, while the proxy in Tang et al. ' s definition has only one key pair; (ii) In Tang's definition, the delegators and the delegatees have to be in different systems, which means that the user in a given system can only act as either (not both) a delegator or a delegatee. In contrast, in Weng et al. ' s definition, a user can be the delegator for any other users, and can also be the delegatee for any other users. (iii) Both of the security notions in [5, 6] only consider the second level ciphertext security, and do not address the first level ciphertext security.
In this paper, we re-formalize the definition for C-PRE by incorporating the advantages in [6, 5] . More specifically, in our formalization the proxy holds only one key (re-encryption key) for performing transformations, and a user can act as the delegator or the delegatee for any other users. We also define the first level ciphertext security for C-PRE. We then propose a new C-PRE scheme, and prove its CCA-security under the well-studied decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) assumption in the random oracle model. Our scheme has better overall efficiency in terms of both computation and communication than Tang's and Weng et al.'s schemes. In addition, we show that Weng et al.'s C-PRE scheme fails to achieve the CCA-security.
Related Work
Mambo and Okamoto [7] firstly introduced the concept of delegation of decryption rights, as a better-performance alternative to the trivial approach of decrypting-then-encrypting of ciphertexts. Blaze, Bleumer and Strauss [1] formalized the concept of proxy re-encryption, and proposed the first bidirectional PRE scheme (in which the delegation from Alice to Bob also allows re-encryption from Bob to Alice). In 2005, Ateniese et al. [2, 3] presented unidirectional PRE schemes based on bilinear pairings.
The schemes in [1, 2, 3] are only secure against chosen-plaintext attacks (CPA). However, applications often require the CCA-security. In ACM CCS'07, Canetti and Hohenberger [8] presented a CCA-secure bidirectional PRE scheme from bilinear pairings. Later, Libert and Vergnaud [4] gave a unidirectional PRE scheme secure against replayable chosen-ciphertext attacks (RCCA) [9] . In their extended version, Libert and Vergnaud [10] further consider the the problem of conditional proxy re-encryption, and suggested a RCCA-secure C-PRE scheme in the standard model without assuming registered public keys 2 . Previous PRE schemes rely on the costly bilinear pairings. Thus Canetti and Hohenberger [8] left an open question to construct CCA-secure PRE without pairings. In CANS'08, Deng et al. [11] proposed a CCA-secure bidirectional PRE scheme without pairings. In PKC'09, Shao and Cao [12] proposed a unidirectional PRE scheme without pairings, and claimed that their scheme is CCA-secure. However, Weng et al. [13] pointed out that Shao and Cao's PRE scheme is not CCA-secure by presenting a concrete attack. Weng et al. [13] further presented an efficient CCA-secure unidirectional PRE scheme without pairings.
Traceable proxy re-encryption, introduced by Libert and Vergnaud [14] , attempts to solve the problem of disclosing re-encryption keys, by tracing the proxies who have done so. Proxy re-encryption has also been studied in identity-based scenarios, such as [15, 16, 17] . Recently, Chu et al. [18] introduced a generalized version of C-PRE named conditional proxy broadcast re-encryption (CPBRE), in which the proxy can re-encrypt the ciphertexts for a set of users at a time.
Model of Conditional Proxy Re-encryption
Before re-formalizing the definition and security notions for C-PRE, we first explain some notations used in the rest of this paper. For a finite set S, x ∈ R S means choosing an element x from S with a uniform distribution. For a string x, |x| denotes its bit-length. We use A(x, y, · · · ) to indicate that A is an algorithm with the input (x, y, · · · ). By z ← A(x, y, · · · ), we indicate the running of A(x, y, · · · ) and letting z be the output. We use A O1,O2,··· (x, y, · · · ) to denote that A is an algorithm with the input (x, y, · · · ) and can access to oracles
, and letting z be the output. The correctness of C-PRE means that, for any condition w, any m ∈ M, and any couple of private/public key pairs (pk i , sk i ), (pk j , sk j ), it holds that
Definition of C-PRE Systems
Dec 2 (Enc 2 (pk i , m, w), sk i ) = m, Dec 1 (Enc 1 (pk i , m), sk i ) = m, Dec 1 (ReEnc(Enc 2 (pk i , m, w), ReKeyGen(sk i , w, pk j )), sk j ) = m.
Security Notions
In this subsection, we will define the security notions for C-PRE systems. Before giving these security notions, we first consider the following oracles which together model the ability of an adversary. These oracles are provided for the adversary A by a challenger C who simulates an environment running C-PRE.
-Uncorrupted key generation oracle O u (i): C runs algorithm KeyGen to generate a public/private key pair (pk i , sk i ), and returns pk i to A. -Corrupted key generation oracle O c (i): C runs algorithm KeyGen to generate a public/private key pair (pk j , sk j ),, and returns (pk j , sk j ) to A. -First level decryption oracle O 1d (pk, CT): Here CT is a first level ciphertext.
C runs Dec 1 (CT, sk), and returns the corresponding result to A. Note that for the last three oracles, it is required that pk i , pk j and pk were generated beforehand by either O c or O u .
We are now ready to define the semantic security for C-PRE under choseciphertext attacks. Libert and Vergnaud [4] differentiated two kinds of semantic security for traditional (single-hop) unidirectional PRE systems: first level ciphertext security and second level ciphertext security. We here follow Libert and Vergnaud's definitions, and define these two kinds security notions for C-PREs.
Second level ciphertext security. Intuitively speaking, second level ciphertext security models the scenario that the adversary A is challenged with a second level ciphertext CT * encrypted under a target public key pk i * and a target condition w * . A can issue a series of queries to the above five oracles. These queries are allowed as long as they would not allow A to decrypt trivially. For examples, A should not query on O rk (pk i * , w * , pk j ) to obtain an re-encryption key rk
where pk j came from oracle O c . Otherwise, A can trivially decrypt the challenge ciphertext by first re-encrypting it into a first level ciphertext and then decrypting it with sk j . Similarly, A cannot query on
), A is disallowed to query on O 1d (pk j , CT ). One might wonder that why we do not provide the second level decryption oracle for A. In fact, explicitly providing adversary A with this oracle is useless, since (i). for the challenge ciphertext CT * , A is obviously not allowed to ask the second level decryption oracle to decrypt it; (ii). while for any other second level ciphertext CT t encrypted under public key pk t and condition w such that (pk t , w, CT t ) = (pk i * , w * , CT * ), adversary A can first issue a re-encryption query O re (pk t , pk j , (w, CT t )) to obtain a first level ciphertext CT j , and then issue a first level decryption query O 1d (pk j , CT j ) to obtain the underlying plaintext. Below gives the formal definition for second level ciphertext's sematic security under adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (IND-2CPRE-CCA). 
Definition 1. For a C-PRE scheme E and a probabilistic polynomial time adversary A running in two stages find and guess, we define A's advantage against the IND-2CPRE-CCA security of E as
First Level Ciphertext Security. The above definition provides the adversary with a second level ciphertext in the challenge phase. Next, we define a complementary definition of security (denote by IND-1CPRE-CCA) by providing the adversary with a first level ciphertext in the challenge phase. Note that, since the first level ciphertext cannot be re-encrypted in a single hop C-PRE scheme, A is allowed to obtain any re-encryption keys. Furthermore, given these re-encryption keys, A can re-encrypt ciphertexts by himself, and hence there is no need to provide the re-encryption oracle O re for him. As argued before, the second level decryption oracle is also unnecessary. 
Definition 2. For a C-PRE scheme E and a probabilistic polynomial time adversary A running in two stages find and guess, we define A's advantage against the IND-1CPRE-CCA security of E as
Remark. In [2] , Ateniese et al. defined the notion master secret security, for unidirectional proxy re-encryption. This security notion catches the intuition that, even if the dishonest proxy colludes with the delegatee, it is still impossible for them to derive the delegator's private key. Note that for C-PREs, there is no need to define master secret security, since this security is implied by the first level ciphertext security. This is due to the fact that, if the dishonest proxy and the delegatee can collude to derive the delegator's private key, they can certainly use this private key to decrypt the challenge ciphertext, and thus break the first level ciphertext security.
Proposed CCA-Secure C-PRE Scheme
In this section, we propose a new C-PRE scheme with CCA-security. Before presenting our scheme, we list three important and necessary principles for designing CCA-secure C-PRE schemes: (i) the validity of the second level ciphertexts should be publicly verifiable; otherwise, it will suffer from a similar attack as illustrated in [11, 19] ; (ii) the second level ciphertexts should be able to resist the adversary's malicious manipulating; (iii) it should also be impossible for the adversary to maliciously manipulate the first level ciphertext. We remark that it is non-trivial to design a C-PRE scheme satisfying these three requirements, especially the last one. To help understand our scheme, we first present an insecure attempt, and then improve it to obtain our final CCA-secure scheme.
A First Attempt
We denote this first attempt by S1, which is specified as below:
On input a security parameter 1 κ , the setup algorithm first determines (q, G, G T , e), where q is a κ-bit prime, G and G T are two cyclic groups with prime order q, and e is the bilinear pairing e : G × G → G T . Next, it chooses g ∈ R G, and five hash functions H 1 , H 2 , H 3 , H 4 and H 5 such that
To generate the public/private key pair for user U i , it picks x i ∈ R Z q , and sets the public key and private key to be pk i = g xi and sk i = x i , respectively. ReKeyGen(sk i , w, pk j ): On input a private key sk i , a condition w and a public key pk j , this algorithm randomly picks s ∈ R Z q , and outputs the reencryption key as
Enc 2 (pk, m, w): On input a public key pk, a condition w and a message m ∈ M, the sender first picks R ∈ R G T . Then he computes r = H 1 (m, R), and outputs the second level ciphertext CT = (
Note that the last ciphertext component, C 4 , is used to ensure the public verifiability of the ciphertext, while the first three components, (C 1 , C 2 , C 3 ), are in fact the ciphertext of the CCA-secure ElGamal encryption scheme [20] applying the Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation [21] . Enc 1 (pk, m): On input a public key pk and a message m ∈ M, the sender first picks R ∈ R G T and s ∈ R Z * q . Then he computes r = H 1 (m, R), and outputs the first level ciphertext CT as
ReEnc(CT i , rk i w →j ): On input a second level ciphertext CT i = (C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , C 4 ) associated with condition w under public key pk i , and a re-encryption key rk i w →j = (rk 1 , rk 2 ), it generates the first level ciphertext under public key pk j as follows: Check whether the following equality holds:
If not, output ⊥; else output CT j = (C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , C 4 ) as
Observe that CT j = (C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , C 4 ) is indeed of the following form:
Letting s = s · sk i , it can be seen that the above first level ciphertext has the same form as Eq. (3). Analysis. At first glance, it seems that scheme S1 is CCA-secure. Unfortunately, this is not true, since the adversary can maliciously manipulate the first level ciphertext to get a new yet valid one. Concretely, given the first level ciphertext as in Eq. (3), the adversary can pick ∈ R Z q and produces another first level ciphertext CT = (C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , C 4 ) such that:
Letting s = s+ , we can easily see that CT is another new and valid ciphertext as Eq. (3). Thus the CCA-security can be trivially broken.
CCA-Secure C-PRE Scheme
Indeed, the insecurity of S1 lies in the construction of the re-encryption key, i.e., rk 2 is loosely integrated with rk 1 . This enables the adversary to maliciously manipulate the resulting first level ciphertext and obtain another valid first level ciphertext. So, to design a CCA-secure C-PRE scheme, we should carefully design the re-encryption key, so that the resulting first level ciphertext cannot be maliciously manipulated by the adversary. Based on this observation, we present our CCA-secure C-PRE scheme (denoted by S2) as below: 1 . This is an important trick for scheme S2 to achieve the CCA-security. Enc 2 (pk, m, w): The same as in S1. Enc 1 (pk, w): On input a public key pk and a message m ∈ M, the sender first picks R ∈ R G T and s ∈ R Z * q . Then he computes r = H 1 (m, R), and outputs the first level ciphertext CT = (C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , C 4 ) as
The same as in S1. Note that, since the re-encryption key is different from that in S1, the resulting first level ciphertext CT j = (C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , C 4 ) is of the following forms:
where r = H 1 (m, R) and R ∈ R G T . Letting s = s · sk i , it can be seen that the above first level ciphertext has the same form as Eq. (6) . Note also that, now C 4 is tightly integrated with C 2 by embedding C 4 in
), and hence it is unable for the adversary to modify the first level ciphertext to obtain a new and valid one. Therefore, the attack against scheme S1 does not apply to scheme S2. Dec 2 (CT, sk): The same as in S1. 
Security Analysis
The CCA-security of our schemes S2 is based on a complexity assumption called decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) assumption. The DBDH problem in groups (G,
abc . A polynomial-time algorithm B has advantage in solving the DBDH problem in groups (G, G T ), if
where the probability is taken over the random choices of a, b, c, d in Z q , the random choice of g in G, and the random bits consumed by B.
Definition 3. We say that the (t, )-DBDH assumption holds in groups (G, G T ), if there exists no t-time algorithm B that has advantage in solving the DBDH problem in (G, G T ).
For our scheme's CCA-security at the second level, we have the following theorem, whose detailed proof can be found in Appendix B. 
where τ is the maximum over the time to compute an exponentiation in G,G T , and the time to compute a pairing;ė denotes the base of the natural logarithm.
The first level ciphertext security of S2 is ensured by the following theorem. 
Theorem 2. Our scheme S2 is IND-1CPRE-CCA secure in the random oracle model, assuming the DBDH assumption holds in groups (G, G T
where τ andė have the same meaning as in Theorem 1.
The proof for Theorem 2 is similar to that of Theorem 1 with some modifications. For example, the simulation for the random oracle H 2 no longer need to flip a biased coin, and the simulation for oracle O rk has to successfully answer all the re-encryption key queries without aborting. Due to the space limit, we give the detailed proof in the full paper.
Comparisons
In Table 1 , we compare our scheme with Tang's scheme [5] 3 , Weng et al.'s scheme [6] and Livert-Vergnaud's scheme [10] . We first explain some notations used in Tang's scheme needs an additional public key encryption scheme PKE, which is assumed to be deterministic and one-way 4 . We here use t EncPKE and t DecPKE to represent the computational cost of an encryption and a decryption in the public key encryption(PKE) scheme used in Tang's scheme. For |C PKE |, it denotes the ciphertext length of scheme PKE used in Tang's scheme.
The comparison results indicate that our scheme S2 outperforms Tang's scheme in terms of both computational and communicational costs. Our scheme has a better overall performance than Weng et al.'s scheme: The ciphertext length and computation cost for first level encryption and decryption in Weng et al.'s scheme lead ours, while ours beats theirs in the other metrics; most importantly, our scheme is CCA-secure, while theirs fails. Our scheme also has a better overall performance than Libert-Vergnaud's scheme. Besides, ours is CCA-secure under the well-studied DBDH assumption, while Libert-Vergnaud's scheme only satisfies the RCCA-security (which is a weaker variant of CCA-security assuming a harmless mauling of the challenge ciphertext is tolerated) under a less studied assumption, named 3-weak decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman inversion (3-wDBDH) assumption. However, like Tang and Weng et al.'s schemes, our scheme suffers from a limitation that its security relies on the random oracle in the know secret key model, while Libert-Vergnaud's scheme can be proved without random oracles in the chosen-key model. der our model. In addition, we gave an attack to Weng et al.'s C-PRE scheme, showing that it fails to achieve the CCA-security.
This work motivates some interesting open questions. One is how to construct a CCA-secure (instead of RCCA-secure) C-PRE scheme without random oracles. Another is how to construct CCA-secure C-PRE schemes supporting "OR" and "AND" gates over conditions.
According to the security model defined in [6] , for a target public key pk i * and a target condition w * , even if the adversary has corrupted another user's secret key sk j , he is still allowed to obtain one (not both) of the partial re-encryption key rk i * ,j and the condition key ck i * ,w * . Now, we explain how an adversary can break the CCA-security of Weng et al. ' Using e(g, g) r , she can certainly decrypt the first level ciphertext to obtain the underlying plaintext.
B Security Proof for Theorem 1
Proof. Suppose algorithm B is given a DBDH instance (g,
abc . B works by interacting with adversary A in the IND-2CPRE-CCA game as follows: Otherwise, choose μ, μ ∈ R Z q , and use the Coron's proof technique [22] to flip a biased coin coin i ∈ {0, 1} that yields 1 with probability θ and 0 with probability 1 − θ. Find Stage. In this stage, adversary A issues a series of queries subject to the restrictions of the IND-2CPRE-CCA game. B maintains a list K list which is initially empty, and answers these queries for A as follows:
and defines pk i = (g a ) xi . Next, it sets c i = 0 and adds the tuple (pk i , x i , c i ) to the K list . Finally, it returns pk i to adversary A. -Corrupted key generation oracle O c (j): B first picks x j ∈ R Z q and defines pk j = g xj and c j = 1. Next, it adds the tuple (pk j , x j , c j ) to the K list and returns (pk j , x j ) to adversary A.
-Re-encryption key oracle O rk (pk i , w, pk j ): B first recovers (pk i , w, coin i , μ, μ , pk j , (w,  * ) ).
